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From Agriculture to Food Security: 
Embedded Liberalism and Stories of Regulatory Change 
 
Fiona Smith1 
 
ÒOnce there was a boy who was told by his master to catch a hare. He went to the woods and looked 
aroundÉat that very moment he saw a hare running along at full speed. As he watched in astonishment, the 
hare ran smack into the tree and knocked itself unconscious. All he had to do was pick up the hare. For the rest 
of his life the boy waited behind the same tree in the hope that more hares would do the same thing.Ó2 
 
There are two stories about why the rules governing international agricultural trade change. 
The first is a conventional story. The second is a more complex analysis- the embedded 
liberalism story.  
The first, the conventional story, is a simple story of regulatory change. In essence, 
international agricultural trade rules become unfit for purpose over time because they are 
drafted in different eras, during different economic circumstances and are designed to 
overcome different political challenges.3 This story teaches us that, to Ôwork,Õ rules must be 
changed-updated-to regulate the contemporary challenges of modern international 
agricultural trade, like food security or climate change, for example.4  
The second story is more nuanced, and though not told in the context of international 
agricultural trade regulation, when applied to that field, it gives a deeper account of why the 
rules change. In this story, international agricultural trade rules are created because powerful 
states want to achieve two things: a multilateral solution to the global problems of 
                                                        
1 Professor of International Economic Law, University of Warwick. I want to thank Gillian Moon, Lisa Toohey, 
Frank Garcia, Garry Watt, Michael Cardwell and John McEldowney for comments on earlier drafts of this 
article. Any errors remain my own. 
2 Adeline Yen Mah, Watching the Tree, (Broadway Books, 2001), 6. 
3 T J Schoenbaum, ÒFashioning a New Regime for Agricultural Trade: New Issues and the Global Food CrisisÓ, 
Journal of International Economic Law 14(3) (2011), 593. 
4 C Haberli, ÒFood Security and WTO Rules,Ó in B. Karapinar & C. Haberli (eds), Food Crises and the WTO, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), 297. 
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agricultural trade and the freedom to pursue their own important domestic social goals.5 The 
fragile balance between these two contradictory goals-multilateralism and domestic 
autonomy- is embedded into the rules. This is the story of Ôembedded liberalismÕ as told by 
John Ruggie in his seminal 1982 article.6  
RuggieÕs story teaches us that regulatory change happens when both the power shifts away 
from the state that was dominant at the time the rules were drafted (the ÔhegemonÕ) and the 
underlying social purpose embedded in the rules no longer reflects the new geopolitical 
power balance between states and social context in which those rules must operate. Existing 
rules remain effective when there is a simple power shift among states, but are no longer 
effective when this power shift is accompanied too by a shift in the Òlegitimate social 
purpose;Ó when these two coincide, regulatory change is inevitable.7   
John RuggieÕs theory of embedded liberalism is seminal because he shows how a familiar 
story of the emergence of international economic rules, their interpretation and the reasons 
why those rules change could be told in a new way to shed light on a different aspect of the 
complex economic, social and political interactions between states. For me, RuggieÕs work is 
important because he shows history is contingent: that is, his work shows that how we 
interpret historical ÒfactÓ and what lessons we claim to learn from the past is dependent on 
what moments in history we look at among the myriad of possible moments. We choose 
those historical moments because we want to understand something about our present.8 
RuggieÕs seminal contribution to international relations scholarship is that he showed that 
there are always more perspectives from which those historical moments can be viewed; 
                                                        
5 Ruggie: ÒInternational Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
OrderÓ International Organization, 36(2) Spring (1982) 379, 382. 
6 Ruggie ibid. 
7 Ruggie, ibid, 382. 
8 Ruggie does not make a claim for a new way of reading history in his article. Rather his discussion rejects the 
dominant theory of power relations between states-hegemonic stability theory-in favour of a social theory that 
focuses on what determines the content of the international economic order: Ruggie ibid, 382. For a clear 
discussion on RuggieÕs theory and its limitations, see A Lang, World Trade Law After Neoliberalism: re-
Imagining the Global Economic Order, (Oxford University Press, 2011), particularly 176 to177. 
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more moments in history to explore and more ways of understanding our present by looking 
at the past. From 1982, RuggieÕs work allowed scholars to tell different stories about what 
drives regulatory change in international economic law and teach new lessons how we might 
learn from the past to help resolve the problems of the present.9 It is his insight into historical 
analysis from John RuggieÕs work that I explore in this article with reference to international 
agricultural trade.   
I argue below that seeing history as a ÔwarehouseÕ to be explored, rather than a fixed set of 
facts with predetermined meanings, allows new stories to emerge about why international 
agricultural trade rules change.10 By telling new stories, our understanding deepens. By 
looking at the past, we may better explain the place and function of law in the ever-changing 
economic, social and political relations between states in the face of global challenges.11  
In an article of this length, I cannot present an exhaustive treatment of the history of 
international agricultural trade regulation together with the complex political, social, 
economic and legal dynamics influencing regulatory change.12 Instead, I present an edited 
account sufficient to show that telling the story of the same past events from another 
perspective teaches us to attribute different significance to the role of those events in driving 
regulatory change.  
The discussion is in three parts. First, the conventional story why international agricultural 
trade rules change is told. It begins with the Havana Charter rules designed to stabilise 
agricultural commodity trade after the devastation of World War II. It moves on to consider 
the problems of the GATT, the strong regulatory framework of the World Trade 
                                                        
9 Many scholars have been inspired by RuggieÕs approach: see contributions to this volume & Lang ibid, and in 
the context of food security, A Orford, ÒFood Security, Free Trade and the Battle for the State,Ó Journal of 
International Law and International Relations, (2015) 11(2), 1 
10 M Oakeshott, ÒThe activity of being an historian,Ó in M Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics (Liberty Fund, 
1991), 151, 157. 
11 For an excellent example of a new story in agricultural trade regulation see Orford above n9. 
12 On the history of international agricultural trade regulation see M. Desta, The Law of International Trade in 
Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (Kluwer 2002); on the history 
of food security, see Orford ibid; and on the evolution of international economic law generally see Lang above 
n8. 
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OrganisationÕs Agreement on Agriculture (Agriculture Agreement) and the pressures on the 
current rules which may result in regulatory change. Second, the story is told from the 
perspective of embedded liberalism. This shows that when the story of international 
agricultural trade regulation is told in a different way, but drawing on the same moments, 
new lessons about why rules change appear. Finally, in the conclusion, I speculate which 
stories have yet to be told and what lessons those stories may teach us about regulatory 
change in international agricultural trade.  
 
A CONVENTIONAL STORY 
The conventional story takes (and supplies) the orthodox perspective on why international 
agricultural trade rules change. This story, or at least some parts of it, is found in reports 
issued by the key multilateral organisations, like the OECD, the World Bank, UNCTAD as 
well as the GATT and the WTO.13 It is the story that underpins critiques of trade rules made 
by eminent academic economists and lawyers14; and it is the story that underpins the ethos of 
large non-governmental organisations like OXFAM, and the more disparate international 
peasant movement when they lobby for removal of the existing rules in favour of rules that 
Òwork.Ó15   
History shows that international agricultural trade is notoriously difficult to regulate.16 
Farming practices can be beneficial to the environment and to rural communities, so some 
developed states in particular encourage such practices through their domestic farm policies. 
By cultivating the land, farmers maintain attractive landscapes which attract tourists to rural 
areas thereby generating important revenue for local communities. Farmers contribute to 
                                                        
13 G. Haberler et al, Trends in International Trade: a report by a panel of experts, (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, 1958) (ÒHaberler ReportÓ). 
14 The literature is vast, but see Desta above n12; Schoenbaum above n3. 
15 For example: OXFAM ÒGROWÓ campaign: www.oxfam.org/en/campaigns/grow. La Via Campesina: the 
2007 Joint Nylni Declaration following the Food Sovereignty World Assembly in Mali, West Africa para 3: 
www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290.  
16 Haberler Report above n13. 
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biodiversity preservation too when they farm in ways that are beneficial to the climate and 
the environment. It is agricultureÕs ÔmultifunctionalityÕ- its ability to generate benefits to 
communities, the climate and the environment at the same time as the inherent economic 
value of the agricultural products-that makes the balance between open trade and appropriate 
intervention in the market (Ôlawful protected tradeÕ) difficult to achieve in international trade 
regulation.17 This is because some states encourage their farmers to adopt such beneficial 
practices through import barriers and targeted domestic support policies18 that distort trade 
when they are linked to export or the production of specific agricultural products.19 The ITO, 
the GATT and the WTO rules each capture this balance between open trade and lawful 
protected trade in different ways.  
In the conventional story, regulatory change happens when the existing rules cannot maintain 
that balance, either because states implement ÒprotectionistÓ agricultural policies that 
undermine trade and agricultural production in other, sometimes weaker less developed 
states, despite the existence of the regulation;20 or because the rules do not provide sufficient 
flexibility to enable states to pursue important policy objectives in their domestic agricultural 
policies. 21 Although, as will become apparent below, the conventional story is less able to 
                                                        
17 I use the term Òlawful protected tradeÓ to include statesÕ use of non-tariff barriers (eg subsidies, labelling and 
licensing) to achieve legitimate goals in their domestic agricultural policies. On multifunctionality see OECD, 
Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework, (2001), 13 on the definition of multifunctionality: 
OECD, Multifunctionality in Agriculture: Evaluating the Degree of Jointness, Policy Implications, (2008) 
exploring how ÒjointnessÓ occurs and how it might be measured & OECD, Multifunctionality: The Policy 
Implications, (2003) exploring which are the best policies to promote positive commodity outputs in agriculture. 
18 Subsidies for Òpublic goods.Ó L Madureira, J Lima Santos, A Ferreira et al., Feasibility Study on the 
Valuation of Public Goods and Externalities in EU Agriculture (JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, European 
Commission, 2013) 14 
19 Haberler Report above n13; D Hathaway, ÒAgriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the RulesÓ Policy Issues in 
International Economics, 20, (Institute for International Economics, 1987).  
20 T Josling, ÒAgricultural Trade Policy: Completing the Reform,Ó Policy Analyses in International Economics 
53 (Institute for International Economics, 1998). 
21 See M N Cardwell and F Smith, ÒRenegotiation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture: Accommodating the 
New Big Issues,Ó International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 62(4) (2013), 865. 
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account for why there is so little progress towards regulatory change in the Doha 
Development Round of multilateral trade talks.22 
ITO to the GATT 
The Havana Charter establishing the ITO created a ÔnewÕ international code governing 
commercial behaviour in Chapter 4, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The GATT was to be read together with more detailed rules on inter-governmental 
commodity agreements, restrictive business practices and hidden barriers to trade.23 The ITO 
would govern all these rules in a pioneering move where sovereign states ceded autonomy 
over their trade policy to the new international organisation.24 States were to obtain mutual 
benefits from more open trade underpinned by the regulatory structure, with the principle of 
non-discrimination- contained in GATTÕs most favoured nation (MFN) and national 
treatment clauses at its heart.25   
Chapter 6 of the ITO recognised that international trade in agricultural commodities caused 
Òspecial difficultiesÓ to farmers and consumers because such products had a tendency 
towards Òpersistent disequilibrium between production and consumption, the accumulation of 
burdensome stocks and pronounced fluctuations in prices.Ó26 The ITO therefore allowed 
states to intervene to stabilise commodity prices under certain circumstances to protect their 
farmers from the effects of volatile market prices.  
As Article 57 ITO pragmatically put it, state intervention in the market under those 
circumstances was justified because ÒÉadjustments between production and consumption 
cannot be effected by market forces alone as rapidly as circumstances allow.Ó These inter- 
                                                        
22 Talks in agriculture started in 1997, but the Doha Round was launched in 2001: WTO, ÒMinisterial 
Declaration,Ó WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (November 20, 2001). 
23 For example, see M Fakhri, Sugar and the Making of International Trade Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
24 C H Alexandrowicz, International Economic Organizations, (Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1952) 164 to 165. 
25 Article I and III GATT. 
26 Article 55 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ÒHavana CharterÓ), 1948, 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e/pdf. 
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governmental commodity agreements could take a simple form, but equally if circumstances 
required it, imports and exports could be reduced, prices affected and production methods 
changed. These agreements were to be monitored by a separate Council, by the ITO and 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to determine whether they 
remained effective, with the view that the agreements be terminated after five years at the 
latest.27 It provided a highly flexible and sophisticated legal solution to an immediate political 
and economic problem. 28  
USÕ Congress failure to ratify the Havana Charter ensured the ITO did not come into 
existence.29 Its rules allowing states to intervene and protect their farmers during periods of 
commodity price volatility did not come into effect therefore. As Lang notes, after the failure 
of the ITO, the rules governing agricultural trade in the GATT were more focused on opening 
trade, particularly reducing industrial tariffs, with the consequence that many domestic 
agricultural policies were unregulated.30  
GATT allowed states to limit exports of agricultural products on a temporary basis if they 
declared a food shortage.31 Import restrictions were permitted when necessary to help 
ÒsecureÓ specific domestic policy objectives in agriculture, especially if a country had a 
surplus and restricted imports until the surplus ran out.32 Article XVI:4 GATT prohibited 
export subsidies in statesÕ trade policies. In contrast, under Article XVI:3 GATT states were 
encouraged only to Òavoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products.Ó33 
Violation of Article XVI:3 was found when the complaining state demonstrated the export 
subsidy was Òapplied in a manner which results in that contracting party having a more than 
                                                        
27 Article 64 Havana Charter ibid. 
28 Article 59 and 62 Havana Charter ibid., and discussion by Alexandrowicz above n24 167 to168. 
29 For example, J H Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT, (Bobbs Merrill,1969) Ch 27. 
30 Lang above n8, 28. 
31 Article XI:2(c)(i) GATT. 
32 Article XI:2(c)(iii) GATT. 
33 My emphasis. 
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equitable share of world trade.Ó34 A test that was only proven once successfully in GATT 
dispute settlement proceedings in the French Wheat Flour dispute, even though a dispute 
with similar facts between the United States and the European Economic Communities came 
before a GATT dispute panel in 1983.35  
Domestic subsidies paid to farmers were not prohibited under the GATT, although 
countervailing duties could be imposed on imports to offset the effects of a domestic subsidy 
on the importing countryÕs farmers.36 Farmers in the United States and those in the European 
Economic Communities received domestic subsidies to cover all or some of their production 
costs and export subsidies to insulate any exported produce from low world prices.37 
Consequently, these farmers increased production in response to the domestic subsidy, 
knowing that if they produced too much at a time of low global commodity prices, they could 
still sell their goods at the low price because that sale was subsidised through export 
subsidies, thereby making up the difference between farmersÕ (rising) costs of production and 
the price farmers received on the sale of their goods on the market. Because farmers always 
had a market for their goods, they continued to produce: the excess flooded on to world 
markets priced at, or sometimes below, the market price.38  
Limited regulation of international agricultural trade in the GATT was accompanied by 
ineffective surveillance of statesÕ implementation of those rules. Disputes concerning 
agriculture became an increasingly prominent feature of GATT dispute settlement 
particularly between 1960-1989.39 As Hudec notes in his study of GATT dispute settlement, 
                                                        
34 Article XVI:3 GATT. 
35 GATT Panel Report, French Assistance to Exports of Wheat and Wheat Flour, BISD 7S/46 (GATT, 1958) 
para 15; GATT Panel Report, EEC- Subsidies on Export of Wheat Flour, GATT Doc. SCM/42 (GATT, 1983) 
(unadopted).  
36 Article XVI:1 GATT; but note the different interpretation of this point when considered from the view of 
embedded libersalism below infra. 
37 See generally Hathaway above n19. 
38 These policies had devastating effects on developing and least-developed countriesÕ attempts to export their 
production see B Gardener, European Agriculture: Policies, Production and Trade, (Routledge, 1996), 15 to 62. 
39 R E Hudec, Enforcing International Trade LawÓ The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, 
(Butterworth, 1993), 327. 
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agriculture featured in 89 of the 207 recorded GATT complaints, with many remaining 
unresolved until the end of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks establishing the 
WTO ended.40 
The failure of the ITO encouraged the United States and the European Economic 
Communities to pursue unilateral policies to protect their farmers under the protection of a 
waiver (United States) and exemption (European Economic Communities) from the already 
limited rules of the GATT.41 GATTÕs ineffective dispute settlement system and weak 
surveillance of the European Economic CommunitiesÕ agricultural policy, the CAP, 
compounded the problem. Governance of international agricultural trade became bifurcated 
between states who were subject to the limited rules and those who were not. Developing and 
least-developed countries were particularly badly affected by the protectionist domestic 
agricultural policies of developed countries.42 By the start of the Uruguay Round, the lack of 
effective regulation in international agricultural trade either in the rules, or through 
surveillance and formal dispute settlement meant regulatory change became inevitable.  
The WTO 
Unlike the GATT, the WTO regulates agricultural trade through legally binding agreements 
and non-binding decisions and statesÕ obligations are enforced through legally binding 
dispute settlement proceedings.43 The Agriculture Agreement coupled with the Decision on 
Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-
Developed and Net-Food Importing Countries primarily govern trade in agricultural products 
                                                        
40 Hudec ibid, 327. 
41 GATT, Waiver Granted to the United States in Connection with Import Restrictions Imposed under Section 
22 Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 1933) as amended BISD3S/32. The Act allowed the United States to impose 
tariffs, import restrictions and export subsidies to protect American farmers from commodity price volatility.  
Supervision of the EECÕs CAP in the GATT: GATT, Trade in Agricultural Products, BISD6S/76 (1957), 81 
and Section C. 
42 A detailed discussion of the effects on these countries is outside the scope of this discussion, but see R E 
Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, (Trade Policy Research Centre, 1987). 
43 Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding). 
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and some other aspects of statesÕ domestic agricultural policies.44 Other WTO agreements 
and decisions also have an impact on agriculture, notably, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Agreement), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies 
Agreement), the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) and the Decision on Measures in Favour of 
Developing Countries.  
As the primary source of international agricultural trade regulation, the Preamble to the 
Agriculture Agreement makes it clear that domestic agricultural policies will be regulated for 
the first time together with agricultural import tariffs. The new rules are designed to start 
unravelling the protectionism of the GATT era by substituting GATTÕs liberal rules for 
Òstrengthened and more operationally effective Érules and disciplinesÓ thereby creating a 
Òfair and market-oriented agricultural trading system.Ó 45 The Agreement on Agriculture rules 
cover import tariffs, domestic and export subsidies, respectively referred to in the Agreement 
as Òmarket accessÓ,46 Òdomestic supportÓ47 and Òexport competition.Ó48  
Article 4.2 prohibits the creation of new non-tariff barriers on agricultural imports. All non-
tariff barriers existing prior to the WTO rules, like, for example, the European Economic 
CommunitiesÕ variable import levy that insulated European farmers from cheaper agricultural 
imports, had to be converted into tariffs through a process called Òtariffication.Ó49 Tariff rate 
quotas were introduced to create import opportunities when converted tariffs were so high 
that they operated as de facto import prohibitions.50 All agricultural developed countriesÕ 
                                                        
44 For a detailed discussion see: J A McMahon, The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, (Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
45 Preamble Agriculture Agreement, para 2. 
46 Part III and Annex 5 Agriculture Agreement. 
47 Part IV and Annexes 2, 3 and 4 Agriculture Agreement. 
48 Part V Agriculture Agreement. 
49 GATT, Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme, 
MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, December 20 (GATT, 1993), Annex 3. 
50 Modalities document ibid, paras 5, 6 and 7. 
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tariffs (including those created through ÔtarifficationÓ) were to be reduced by an overall 
average of 36% over six years (1995-2001), subject to a minimum reduction of 15% for each 
tariff line.51 After the reduction, whatever tariff levels remained act as a ceiling, above which 
import tariffs cannot be imposed, unless the member is raising tariffs in response to an 
unexpected import surge or a drop in the imported productsÕ price.52 This maximum tariff 
rate and any commitments to provide tariff rate quotas form part of a memberÕs Schedule of 
Commitments annexed to the Agreement on Agriculture and are legally binding.53 
Agricultural subsidies are also not prohibited by the WTO, but members did commit to 
progressively reduce them. For domestic subsidies, members were required to calculate the 
total value of their domestic production subsidies (from a 1986-1988 base year) and, in the 
case of developed countries, reduce that value by 20% over 6 years (1995-2001).54 The value 
of production subsidies left at the end of this reduction period is the maximum level of 
production subsidies the WTO member is permitted under the WTO rules.55 This level of 
production subsidies is contained in the WTO memberÕs Schedule of Commitments and is 
legally binding.56 These permitted production subsidies are known as the Amber Box. In 
technical terms, the Ôamber boxÕ is also known as a memberÕs ÒFinal Bound Aggregate 
Measurement of SupportÓ that is, the Òmaximum allowable level of domestic support the 
Member could give to its domestic agricultural producers at the end of the implementation 
period.Ó57  
Some domestic subsidies paid over to farmers were exempt from reduction commitments and 
so members can use them to target domestic policy objectives like, for example, certain food 
                                                        
51 Ibid, para 5. 
52 Note not all WTO members are eligible to use the Ôspecial safeguardÕ measure in Article 5 Agriculture 
Agreement. 
53 Note there are variable implementation commitments for developing and least-developed countries: Article 15 
and 16 Agriculture Agreement. 
54 Modalities Agreement above n49, para 8. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Article 3:2 Agriculture Agreement. 
57 Article 1(h)(i) and 1(h)(ii) Agriculture Agreement. 
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security and protection of the environment, without limit.58 Domestic subsidies that come 
within the scope of Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture (the Green Box) fall 
completely outside the scope of the domestic subsidy reduction commitments.59 For a 
measure to be exempt from reduction commitments under the Green Box, the measure must 
have Ôno or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on productionÕ and be 
Òprovided through a publicly-funded government programme (including revenue foregone) 
not involving transfers from consumers.Ó60  
Unlike the GATT rules which, by their absence, allowed states extensive freedom to 
determine how to use trade measures to achieve important domestic policy objectives, the 
WTO rules constrain this freedom. The Agriculture Agreement distinguishes between 
subsidies tailored to implement specific environmental and development programmes that are 
an important part of statesÕ domestic agricultural policies and the ÔwrongÕ type of subsidy 
that distorts trade because it results in excess production above the levels of demand. GATTÕs 
weak rules allowed states to dump excess production on international markets either in the 
form of inappropriate food aid, or as cheap food thereby protecting developed country 
farmers at the expense of developing and least-developed farmers.61 In contrast, the WTO 
rules make it clear that domestic subsidies must Ònot have the effect of providing price 
support.Ó The measure must also comply with the policy-specific criteria set out in 
paragraphs 2 to 13 Annex 2 Agriculture Agreement. Paragraphs 2 to13 cover various 
subsidies, for example, subsidies paid over for many payments made under environmental 
programmes, emergency safety nets, structural adjustment programmes, as well as 
                                                        
58 Ie subsidies that fall into the Blue Box in Article 6.5 Agriculture Agreement or Green Box in Annex 
Agriculture Agreement. 
59 Article 6:1 Agriculture Agreement. 
60 Annex 2:1(a) and (b) Agriculture Agreement. 
61 Haberler Report above n13.  
 13 
Òdecoupled income support.Ó62 The WTO rules also required developed countriesÕ export 
subsidies to be reduced by 36% in terms of value and 21% in terms of the volume of 
production subsidized.63 No export subsidies can be used by members unless they conform to 
the terms of the Agriculture Agreement.64 
The WTOÕs supervision of the Agriculture AgreementÕs rules through the WTO Committee 
on Agriculture and the dispute settlement system is more effective than the GATTÕs. Strict 
interpretation of, for example, the United States and the (by then renamed) European 
CommunitiesÕ domestic and export subsidy commitments in dispute settlement proceedings 
by the WTO Appellate Body reduced statesÕ flexibility to use targeted domestic subsidies to 
meet domestic policy objectives. The bright line between an export subsidy and a domestic 
subsidy was eliminated-a subsidy could violate both rules.65 Export credits fell within the 
rules, even though the wording of Article 10.2 Agriculture Agreement suggested that rules on 
export credits would be brought in only after further discussions among WTO members.66 
The Appellate Body also set out guidelines so states could determine when food safety and 
food standards, foods labelled with their country of origin and measures designed to promote 
ethical production methods are unlawful barriers to trade rather than lawful protected trade.67  
Beyond the WTO: pressures for regulatory change 
                                                        
62 Subsidies that fall within de minimis levels set out in Article 6.4 Agriculture Agreement are also exempt from 
reduction commitments. 
63 Calculated from a 1986 to 1990 base: Modalities Agreement above n49, para 11 and Article 9 Agriculture 
Agreement. 
64 Article 8 Agriculture Agreement and Modalities Agreement, ibid, para 12. 
65 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, (April 28, 
2005), paras 251 to 283. 
66 Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, (March 3, 2005), para 
para 609; see also Appellate Body Report, Article 21.5DSU Reference, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008). 
67 See for example, Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, (January 16,1998); United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R, (May 16,2012); United States-Certain Country of 
Origin Labelling Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R, (June 29, 2012). 
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Despite the WTOÕs comprehensive rules, there is further pressure for regulatory change 
because the rules no longer address the contemporary problems of international agricultural 
trade.68 There are multiple pressures, but two main problems can be highlighted.  
First, multinational corporations like, for example, Walmart, Coca-Cola and Glencore, trade 
in agriculture and food across state boundaries through extensive and complex agri-food 
global value chains.69 For example, CocaCola is now one of the largest sugar purchasers in 
the world, purchasing approximately 8% of all sugar produced for industrial purposes from 
multiple countries.70 In these complex chains, trade in distinct agricultural goods and services 
is replaced by Òtrade in tasksÓ as every discrete stage of production and processing is spread 
among many farmers and food and fuel processors scattered throughout the world, rather than 
being confined to a single state.71  
The WTO rules were intended to start cutting the protectionist barriers to agricultural trade of 
the GATT era. Consequently, they are aligned to traditional trade measures, like import 
barriers and subsidies, that states use in their agricultural policies to achieve specific policy 
objectives. Such rules are designed to operate within state jurisdictional boundaries by 
reducing barriers to trade, while allowing states to use trade measures to achieve non-trade 
objectives, like food security and preservation of the environment. They are increasingly 
irrelevant in a global market place without borders when what is at stake is extracting the 
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Òvalue-addedÓ at each stage of production, irrespective of where that value is located and 
whether that value comes from the addition of goods or services, or a combination of both.72  
Second, wealth and prosperity for developing and least-developed countries generated 
through agricultural trade remains elusive.73 Some countries could rely on trade in 
agricultural products to bring in income for investment in infrastructure and to help fund 
social programmes like, for example, education and the provision of food for their poor and 
vulnerable citizens. However, uncertainty remains whether policies like, for example, IndiaÕs 
public stockholding of food under its National Food Security Act 2013, fit within the Green 
Box exemption in the Agriculture Agreement.74  
Some developing countries and least-developed countriesÕ farmers too cannot compete when, 
for example, important agricultural exporters like the United States and the European Union 
heavily subsidise their farmersÕ crops and livestock production so there is a glut on world 
markets; or where countries ÔdumpÕ their excess agricultural production on developing 
country markets under the guise of Ôfood aidÕ which only serves to drives down the price 
developing country farmers can obtain for their produce.75  
States, like India, raise concerns that the Appellate BodyÕs rigid interpretation of statesÕ 
obligations in the Agriculture Agreement, may mean they cannot meet the needs of their 
citizens and still comply with their obligations in the WTO but that the rules allow too much 
flexibility for some states like the United States, who rely on subsidies to protect their 
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farmers. This imbalance between statesÕ policy objectives and the flexibility of the current 
rules means that regulatory change is inevitable to realign this imbalance.  
 
EMBEDDED LIBERALISM: A COMPLEX STORY OF REGULATORY CHANGE 
Embedded liberalism is a reimagining of the conventional story why the rules of international 
agricultural trade change. Like the conventional story, it tells how the rules emerge in the 
post-war economy, how they become ineffective over time, how the comprehensive rules on 
agricultural trade in the WTO then come into being and how pressure for change to those 
rules occurs.  
For Ruggie, ÒÉto say anything sensible about the content of international economic orders 
and about the regimes that serve them, it is necessary to look at how power and legitimate 
social purpose become fused to project political authority into the international system.Ó76 
Told from this perspective, the story begins in the 1940s during talks of post-war 
reconstruction. Europe devastated by war needed to build up agricultural production and its 
non-existent infrastructure.77 By contrast, the United States relatively untouched domestically 
by the effects of the war and with domestic agricultural production boosted by RooseveltÕs 
ÔNew Deal,Õ needed to export its excess agricultural production.78 The United States wanted 
any restrictions to its export ambitions removed. But more importantly, the United States 
believed international trade rules in general could guarantee peace: if every country traded 
and became dependent on each other for essential goods, then there was little incentive for 
states to enter into conflicts, or for any small disagreements to escalate. 
This innovative Òfree tradeÓ ethos of the post-war international agricultural trade regime had 
been foreshadowed to some extent by several factors. First, Cordell Hull, the United States 
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Secretary of State responsible for shaping the United StatesÕ peacetime foreign policy during 
Second World War. 79 He genuinely believed allowing trade restrictions on natural resources 
undermined efforts to maintain peace.80 The early stages of talks between the United States 
and the United Kingdom (the other key international player during this inter-war period) on 
how best to maintain international peace post-World War II were heavily influenced by this 
Òfree tradeÓ philosophy. Even the subsequent United StatesÕ proposals for the new ITO, were 
premised on the fundamental assumption that balanced world economic growth and a higher 
standard of living could be achieved only against a background of open trade, or when only 
Ònormal market forcesÓ governed statesÕ trading activities.81  
Second, during World War II, the United States and Great Britain dominated global politics 
as the other emerging superpower, the Soviet Union, turned away from international co-
operation to consolidate its power in Eastern Europe and address domestic concerns about 
rural poverty.82  
BritainÕs dominance arose from its historic expansionist ambitions into India, the Caribbean 
and some parts of Africa.83 Free trade, even in agriculture, lay at the heart of British trade 
policy after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, and not surprisingly, this ambition to open 
international markets for British agriculture influenced talks on the shape of post-war peace 
between the Britain and the United States held in the mid-1940s.84 By the time of the 
negotiations of the Havana Charter establishing the ITO, the British Empire started to 
fragment and fall away, and with it, BritainÕs strong influence of global trade. This decline 
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coincided with United StatesÕ rise with the consequence that the power to control 
international agricultural trade regulation shifted away from Britain to the United States.85  
ITO to the GATT 
During the negotiations of the ITO, the United StatesÕ negotiating position was still based on 
BritainÕs free trade ethos. It shared BritainÕs preference for removing tariffs and other barriers 
to trade in agriculture driven, in part at least, by its need to export the excess production 
generated by RooseveltÕs ÔNew DealÕ for agriculture that had been implemented in response 
to the Great Depression of the 1930s.86 Although the ITO Charter purported to create 
Òconditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nationsÓ this objective was to be achieved by reducing tariffs and other barriers to 
trade in order to open up international markets to all goods.87  
In other words, liberalized trade was the rulesÕ ultimate objective despite the shift in power to 
the United States because both Britain and the United States believed domestic prosperity and 
international peace flowed from open global markets for agricultural products.88 Given the 
domination of Britain and then the United States over international trade during this period, it 
is not surprising that any attempt by countries to block trade in agricultural products to 
protect their farmers using trade measures, like for example, import restrictions or high 
tariffs, was considered unacceptable.89 
The new rules of the ITO Charter controlled only those aspects of agricultural policy that the 
United States saw as problematic in other countriesÕ domestic policies, and its lack of interest 
in other aspects of agricultural policy, that it regarded as unimportant. For example, as a net 
agricultural exporter, the United States pushed for lower tariff and non-tariff barriers, like 
                                                        
85 On the history of key commodity agreements in agriculture and the rise of the United States: see Orford, 
above n9. 
86 See generally Hathaway above n19. 
87 Para 1 Preamble Charter International Trade Organisation. 
88 D Gale Johnson, World Agriculture in Disarray, (Macmillan, 1973),12 to 13. 
89 Ibid, 12. 
 19 
quotas, to open international (mainly European) markets for its excess production.90 The ITO 
rules governing commodities and the ITOÕs commercial chapter, the GATT, focused, 
unsurprisingly, on lowering import tariffs and import quotas on agricultural products with 
limited exceptions provided by the GATT for emergencies, for example, domestic food 
shortages and balance of payments problems.91  
By contrast, export subsidies allowed farmers to export their goods at market prices even 
when prices fell below domestic production costs. Export subsidies had the potential to both 
harm and help United StatesÕ farmers: cheap, heavily subsidised imported goods could harm 
United StatesÕ farmers when their farmersÕ costs of production exceeded those of any 
imported goods because imported goods were cheaper than those produced by United StatesÕ 
farmers. But, equally, United StatesÕ farmers could sell their products cheaply on 
international markets when they themselves received export subsidies during periods of high 
production costs and low world prices. As there was little competition to United StatesÕ 
agricultural exports immediately post-war, the United States was less concerned about the 
harmful effects of other statesÕ export subsidies to its farmers during the ITO negotiations.92 
As the GATT was the commercial chapter of the ITO, it is not surprising to see that its rules 
mirror this ambivalence. GATT only required countries to enter discussions with others 
potentially affected prior to imposing the proposed export subsidy.93  
Post-war demand for agricultural products incentivised farmers to increase their production: 
mechanization required increased fertilizer use and all these costs were offset by the United 
States providing domestic subsidies to its farmers.94 Demand for imported agricultural 
products was high especially in Europe during this period, so any policies that facilitated 
increased production were acceptable and in some instances positively encouraged. It is not 
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surprising that the GATT rules too reflect this general acceptance of domestic subsidies.95 
Any unexpected problems caused by domestic policies on specific agricultural products were 
to be addressed by creating international commodity agreements concluded under the 
auspices of the ITO. Discussions could take place among affected countries and semi-
formalised decisions for action were the appropriate solution, rather than GATTÕs formal 
rules and dispute settlement proceedings.96  
Despite the pro-United StatesÕ orientation of the ITOÕs rules, US Congress refused to ratify 
the Havana Charter creating the ITO, fearing the effect of foreign competition on their 
farmers. The ITO did not come into existence therefore, although the GATT continued, albeit 
in a temporary form.97 
GATT to the WTO 
Between the decline of the ITO and the creation of the WTO in 1995, GATTÕs weak control 
over domestic agricultural policies facilitated the rise of new agricultural exporters, like the 
European Economic Community, (later the European Union,) to challenge the power of the 
United States to control the shape of international agricultural trade regulation. This 
challenge was coupled with a subtle shift in what was regarded as unacceptable domestic 
agricultural trade policies. Open markets for agricultural products were replaced gradually by 
a growing acceptance of protectionism: high tariffs, non-tariff import restrictions, together 
with heavy use of domestic and import subsidies designed to insulate European and United 
StatesÕ farmers from cheaper imported agricultural products became common.98  
For example, the permissive GATT rules on agricultural products enabled the creation of 
complex domestic agricultural policies like that of the then European Economic 
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CommunityÕs Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).99 The CAPÕs notorious variable import 
levy, permitted by both uncertain interpretations of the scope of GATT rules on the creation 
of regional agreements (Article XXIV GATT) and the use of non-tariff barriers (Article XI 
GATT), protected European farmers from cheaper agricultural imports by raising or lowering 
customs duties on imported agricultural products dependent on the prevailing world price.100 
CAPÕs common organisation of markets for specific agricultural products also allowed 
European farmers to benefit from domestic subsidies if they, for example, grew certain crops 
or produced milk.101 Any excess production was then offloaded onto world markets at cheap 
prices, with any shortfall between the costs of production and the productÕs sale price met by 
export subsidies.102 This increasing volume of cheaper agricultural products from European 
farmers threatened the United StatesÕ continued dominance of international agricultural trade, 
and as a consequence it sought a waiver for its domestic agricultural policy from the already 
limited GATT obligations on agricultural imports.103  
The story of GATTÕs increasing impotence, the growing disquiet especially among 
developing countries over the effect of European and United StatesÕ protectionist agricultural 
policies and the difficult negotiations in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks leading 
to the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is well known and told by eminent 
scholars, so it is not my intention to rehearse it here.104 Rather I want to highlight key points 
in the embedded liberalism story of decline and evolution in international trade regulation 
that culminates in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture.  
Power to dominate international agricultural trade shifts away from the United States to a 
multiplicity of actors, including the European Economic Communities, which, through the 
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CAP, increased the levels of protection available for its farmers from cheaper imports. It 
became increasingly difficult for the United States to gain access to key European markets. 
Free trading nations like Australia and New Zealand pushed for more open agricultural 
markets, a view shared by developing countries who were net-agricultural exporters trying to 
gain access to European and United StatesÕ markets as a way of generating income to develop 
their economic infrastructure.105 This plethora of states arguing that free trade in agriculture 
automatically leads to positive effects for development, food security and other Òlegitimate 
social purposesÓ means GATTÓs loose regulation of domestic policies is seen as facilitating 
protectionism, rather than as a legitimate way for states to pursue non-trade objectives. More 
formal regulation of what is an appropriate non-tariff barrier-one that does not ÒprotectÓ 
domestic markets from international trade-is actively pursued by these states in the Uruguay 
Round and then driven through by an Ôeleventh hourÕ agreement at Blair House in 1993 
between the dominant actors of the Uruguay Round, the United States and the European 
Communities.106 
The WTO and pressure for regulatory change 
Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1993, the balance between open trade and 
lawfully protected trade is contained in the comprehensive rules on agriculture.107 Unlike the 
GATT which left statesÕ domestic agricultural policies mostly unregulated, the WTO 
imposed greater control: the Agriculture Agreement defined and then limited legitimate 
import barriers and set quantitative limits on domestic and export subsidies for the first time. 
The rules, not states, determined whether a domestic or export subsidy was legitimate in the 
WTO. Lawful domestic subsidies were either production subsidies imposed within agreed 
limits, or subsidies that had Òno or at most minimal trade distorting effects, or effects on 
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production.Ó108 Export subsidies could only be imposed in accordance with the rules and only 
within legally binding limits.109  
The comprehensive rules were accompanied too by a more sophisticated system of 
monitoring compliance in the Committee on Agriculture and the dispute settlement system, 
which included a right to appeal on matters of legal interpretation to a standing Appellate 
Body for the first time.110 GATTÕs flexible, diplomatic style of dispute settlement allowed 
states to rely on a combination of legal interpretation of the rules and a recourse to informal 
discussions on the rulesÕ meaning conducted in rounds of trade negotiations, was rejected by 
the WTO Appellate Body.  
Notably in the EC-Sugar dispute, the European Communities (as it then was) tried to argue 
that a footnote covering an aspect of its development policy set out in its Schedule of 
Commitments should be interpreted to give it an additional component to its export subsidy 
commitments in the Agriculture Agreement.111 It argued, the meaning of the footnote was 
Òwell knownÓ to the other states negotiating the rules on agriculture in the Uruguay Round 
and, as such, the meaning attributed to the footnote by states in those negotiations should take 
precedence over any other interpretation put forward in the dispute.112  
The Appellate Body rejected this informal, politically driven interpretation of the footnoteÕs 
scope, in favour of a legal interpretation based on the footnoteÕs Òordinary meaningÓ in 
accordance with the rules on treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.113 It stated: ÒÉwe are not persuaded by these arguments, which rely on the 
presumed knowledge of other Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on the 
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export subsidy practices of the European Communities with respect to ACP/India sugar.Ó114  
Likewise, interpretations by the Appellate Body of the comprehensive rules on non-tariffs 
barriers, like food safety and quality standards provided further boundaries on statesÕ 
autonomy.115  
This increasing restriction on statesÕ flexible use of trade measures to achieve domestic 
policy objectives limited protectionism, but became increasingly difficult to implement. The 
Committee on Agriculture reported that over 85% of all notifications of farm subsidy levels 
under the Agriculture Agreement were either late, or missing completely.116 States were 
finding the lack of flexibility in the rules and in their interpretation constrained their ability to 
pursue key policy objectives like food security.117 Concerns were raised by some developing 
countries, led by India, that these constraints undermined their ability to pursue an 
appropriate food security strategy whereby they stockpiled food to feed to their rural poor.118 
India argued that without a scheme that could both support its poor farmers (who were 
themselves undernourished) and its people, it could not address its citizensÕ right to food.   
In a preemptive response to the possible illegality of its public stockholding scheme, India led 
a campaign during the multilateral trade talks on the reform of the WTO rules prior to the 
2013 Ministerial Meeting at Bali, Indonesia.119 In an important shift in power relations away 
from the domination of the US-European Communities seen in previous negotiating round, 
India, heading a coalition of developing countries, argued for a permanent change in the 
rules. It argued that public stockholding programmes of food should be permitted at 
administered prices, rather than at market prices as currently permitted in the Green Box. 
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India stated that such a change was important and Ònon-negotiableÓ in the light of growing 
concerns of developing countriesÕ domestic food needs and potential supply problems caused 
by the impact of climate change.120  
After intensive negotiations, the WTO members negotiated the Ministerial Decision on 
Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes effectively imposing a time-limited 
moratorium (or Ôpeace clauseÕ) on dispute settlement actions on the legitimacy of such 
schemes in WTO dispute settlement proceedings subject to certain limitations, with a promise 
that further negotiations on a permanent solution would take place subsequently.121 Despite 
expectations that this would resolve the matter at least temporarily, India declared its 
unhappiness with the negotiated Òpeace clauseÓ and informed WTO members that it could 
not support the adoption of another critical new agreement from Bali, the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement,122 until it found permanent movement on the food security issue.123 The Trade 
Facilitation Agreement arguably was the most important outcome of the December 2013 
Ministerial Meeting, ironically because it is projected to increase income from trade to 
developing nations in particular, by reducing overall trade costs and thereby increasing global 
income by over $40billion.124   
Although India later reconsidered its opposition to the Trade Facilitation Agreement in 
favour of negotiating a permanent change to the WTO rules, pressure to reevaluate the 
existing rulesÕ effectives and to accommodate more flexible opportunities for states to use 
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domestic subsidies for food security purposes are on the agenda for the Buenos Aires 
Ministerial Meeting in December 2017.125 
 
CONCLUSION: STORIES YET TO BE TOLD 
International agricultural trade regulation has undergone a series of changes between the 
1940s and 2017. From the ITOÕs abortive rules on inter-governmental commodity 
agreements, to the GATTÕs minimal interference in statesÕ domestic agricultural policies, to 
the WTOÕs extensive rules that constrain statesÕ autonomy, the reasons why the rules change 
are varied and complicated.  
The conventional story tells us that the rules change from the ITO to the GATT and to the 
WTO because GATTÕs rules could no longer contain protectionism in domestic agricultural 
policies, a situation that could not be corrected by the GATTÕs inadequate dispute settlement 
system; that the WTOÕs comprehensive system of rules and successful dispute settlement 
system constrains protectionism, but then lacks the flexibility to address contemporary 
challenges, like food security and trade without borders along global value chains. In this 
story, in the light of these new regulatory challenges, it is not surprising that members are 
reviewing the possibility of using domestic support in more innovative ways to support their 
food security policies.126  
Yet when this story is told from a different perspective-that of John RuggieÕs theory of 
embedded liberalism-new insights into why regulatory change happens in international 
agricultural trade are revealed. The early rules of the ITO and then the GATT reflect the 
interests of the United States, the dominant actor in the immediate post-war period, but this 
dominance is gradually eroded as other actors become more significant, like the European 
Economic Communities. The GATTÕs limited control over statesÕ domestic subsidies and 
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other non-tariff barriers like food standards, allowed states to use these trade measures to 
pursue legitimate social objectives in their domestic agricultural policies. The rise in 
protectionism together with pressure from other liberal free traders, like Australia and New 
Zealand, leads to another change in the rules, this time to the WTO. Regulatory change is 
inevitable as multinationals become the dominant actors and states demand more autonomy 
than permitted under the WTO rules to pursue important policy objectives. 
There is another element of RuggieÕs contribution to scholarship that is more important, but 
often overlooked in my view, and that is his insight that in retelling an accepted historical 
account in a different way, he could articulate different reasons why rules change and when 
this might happen in the future. RuggieÕs seminal 1982 article teaches us that there are other, 
as yet, undiscovered stories in the past that are there to be told and new lessons to learn. I 
provide an abridged account of two possible new stories below.  
First, how is the ÒfarmerÓ portrayed throughout the history of international agricultural trade 
regulation and how is this change reflected in the rules? After the Second World War, 
farmers are simply general providers of food and raw materials in the post-war recovery.127 
Whereas by the mid-GATT period, the farmer becomes a more nuanced figure. It is in this 
period that the Òdeveloped country farmerÓ and the Òdeveloping country farmerÓ emerge.128 
The developed country farmer is more protected by statesÕ domestic agricultural policies 
from the volatility of world markets. From their privileged position, the developed country 
farmer harms other, more vulnerable developing country farmers, who are left to cope 
unprotected by their states in the face of the perceived ÒselfishÓ activities of the developed 
country farmer.  
By the late twentieth century, the developed country farmer provides positive benefits to the 
rural community by providing employment and the environment through their husbandry of 
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the land.129 The picture changes again by the twenty-first century and the farmer becomes an 
ever more fragmented figure, with some, like the global peasant movement- La Via 
Campesina- claiming only certain farmers-the Òpeasant farmersÓ- hold the key to achieving 
global food security and combatting climate change. In contrast, Òindustrial farmersÓ only 
hinder this important work. Unlike their twentieth century counterparts, these industrial 
farmers are no longer confined to developed countries, but are instead identifiable by the way 
they farm, irrespective of where that might be in the world. 130  
A story about why international agricultural trade regulation changes that does not consider 
the changing place of the farmer in regulation can only be partial. This is because as the 
identity of the farmer changes, so too does our perception of what constitutes a legitimate 
domestic farm policy and our perception of where the line is between a legitimate and 
illegitimate interference with state sovereignty in agricultural trade regulation.  
Second, how does our understanding of what ÒagricultureÓ is change over time? In the 1940s, 
agriculture is connected to the production of commodities like corn, cotton, rice and sugar 
exported from production-rich countries like the United States to alleviate chronic 
commodity shortages in war torn Europe. Whilst it is true that some commodities require 
special treatment through commodity agreements, the main concern is to address any 
unexpected seasonal volatility through short-term negotiated solutions, rather than any long-
term special treatment for these products.131  
During the GATT period, commodities, like cotton, become associated with specific 
countries, like Benin and Burkina Faso, who rely on money generated from the production 
and exports to fund development projects.132 Developed country subsidy programmes tied to 
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these specific commodities, like those of the United States,Õ allow a distinction between 
ÒgoodÓ agricultural policies-those that do not harm the potential export income a developing 
and least developed country can achieve from the commodity it produces-and Òbad policiesÓ-
those that do harm that potential income. By the WTO, ÒagricultureÓ shifts beyond 
commodities in their raw or semi-processed state to fully processed products like ethanol and 
hemp.133 Only for the meaning of ÒagricultureÓ to fragment further in the early twenty-first 
century towards a division between Òagricultural production destined for industrial useÓ, like 
biofuel, and Òagriculture production for food.Ó With the steep decline in the oil price in 2015, 
agriculture is increasingly synonymous with food.134 
RuggieÕs lasting contribution to lawyers and political scholars exploring the economic and 
social relationships between states in the global economic order is that he shows us that in 
reaching back into the past to understand why, for example, international agricultural trade 
regulation changes, we should question that past. We should not accept the past as a true and 
factual account of the politics of the time, the trade negotiatorsÕ concerns and the way law 
was then working (or not). Instead, Ruggie reminds us that we must not forget that it is 
simply one enquiry into what happened- one way of understanding the very complex world 
that existed at the time.135 He shows us that if we accept one historical account as true 
without challenging our thinking, we make suggestions for changes to the rules based on this 
ÒknownÓ and ÒacceptedÓ past without understanding that we filter the past through our 
concerns in the present: we use twenty-first century thinking as a lens through which to 
examine the past. We bring our twenty-first century expectations of the way we expect the 
law to work now to the critique of what was wrong with the rules when they were originally 
crafted. We risk treating the historical past as a set of facts, rather than a series of stories 
                                                        
133 Annex 1 Agriculture Agreement.  
134 OECD/FAO, ÒAgricultural Outlook 2014,Ó (2014), Ch 2, ÔFeeding India.Õ 
135 M Oakeshott, On History, (Liberty Fund, 1993). 1, 1 to 2. 
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contingent on our perception of the ÒrealÓ relationship between the politics, economics and 
legal systems existing at the time.  
RuggieÕs story of embedded liberalism shows us that history is contingent and that there are 
always new stories to tell and new lessons to learn. 
 
 
